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POLITICIANS IN THE RANKS: A REVIEW OF THE LAW AND POLICY GOVERNING CIVIL OFFICEHOLDERS IN MILITARY SERVICE
however, the ongoing partial mobilization 5 has shown that current law and policy governing civil officeholders in military service risks entangling the military in partisan politics, or the perception thereof.
After looking at how the principle of nonpartisanship supports military professionalism and healthy civil-military relations, this paper reviews U.S. law and DOD policy governing civil officeholders in military service and recommends changes needed to better protect the military from actual or perceived partisanship.
THE IMPORTANCE OF A NONPARTISAN MILITARY
Actual or perceived partisanship is detrimental to the military profession because it can undermine its legitimacy. 6 Legitimacy in this context is the trust a profession's clients have that members of the profession possess expert knowledge and will apply it effectively for the clients' benefit. A profession's legitimacy erodes when the clients become skeptical of the profession's expertise or believe that the profession pursues its own interests rather than those of the clients. 7 Loss of trust in a profession for either reason may result in more societal control over the profession and ultimately the loss of professional status. 8 In a democracy, the military's clients are the nation's citizens. With a professional military, the citizens have a high degree of trust that the military will use its expertise to protect the state from threats and preserve its democratic principles and institutions, including subordination of the military to civilian authority. When this situation prevails, the military has the legitimacy needed to fulfill its vital obligations to the nation without a level of control that could limit its effectiveness. 9 A military loses legitimacy if it is perceived to act in its own institutional interests or the individual interests of its members, including partisan political interests. 10 The ultimate loss of legitimacy would occur with a military coup, but much lesser self-serving actions, even those not directly challenging civilian control, can reduce the trust between a society and its military. The result is less deference by civilian authorities to assertions of military expertise and less military autonomy over its professional jurisdictions.
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Since the early 1990s, much has been written on the perceived erosion of the U.S. 
SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT LAW AND POLICY
The current The DODD 1344.10 policy that civil officeholders not covered by Section 973(b) may perform the functions of their civil office only if they do not interfere with military duties does not prevent this situation because some politicians will attempt to serve both the military and their constituents. Also, because the statutory prohibition is based on the length of the active duty tour rather than on the potential for partisan entanglements or the perception of them, some civil officeholders mobilized for a year do not understand why they cannot perform both their military and civil office duties. They believe they should be allowed to perform all of these duties for what is only 95 more days.
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The 1983 coverage. 52 Senate conferees blocked that effort by prevailing on their House counterparts to preserve the prohibition on such officers exercising the functions of civil office in exchange for weakening the prohibition on holding civil office 53 A second shortcoming of Section 973(b) is that it does not address candidacy for civil office. The period in which someone on active duty is a candidate for elective civil office is a time prone to allegations of military partisanship because there is often an opponent with an incentive to make them. Accordingly, DODD 1344.10 prohibits candidacy for civil office except when the potential for involving the military in partisan politics is low. This policy prohibition is inadequate in two respects. First, it applies only to reservists who meet the over 270-day threshold of Section 973(b) rather than to all reservists on active duty. This limited coverage reflects the concern that Congress would object to DOD prohibiting candidacy during active duty tours of 270 days or less when it has not prohibited exercising the functions of civil office during tours of that length, but it permits an activity likely to involve the military in allegations of partisanship to occur during significant periods of active duty.
Second, the policy prohibition on candidacy for civil office does not protect military authorities from political pressure to grant an exception or waiver. Governor's veto of bills to authorize the carrying of concealed weapons and require women to consult with a doctor and then wait 24 hours before having an abortion. In violation of the statutory and policy prohibition on exercising the functions of his civil office, Dolan voted in the two successful override efforts, casting the deciding vote on the weapons bill. 63 While Dolan's command erred in giving him leave for that purpose, it denied any partisan motive. 64 But the denials did not stop the national media coverage of Democratic allegations of partisanship, 65 and its inability to fully discuss the subsequent investigation and actions taken pursuant to it hindered the command's efforts to counter the perception of partisanship some in the public had. 66 Another shortcoming of Section 973(b) and DODD 1344.10 is that even when the law and policy are applicable and followed, the public may still think the military is involved in partisan politics because the prohibitions on exercising the functions of civil office and campaigning apply only to the military member, not to the member's civil office staff, family, or other supporters. For example, the public may think a civil officeholder on active duty for a year is performing both military and civil office functions because constituent service offices are still open. Also, in the case of members with an exception to the prohibition on being a candidate for civil office, the general public may think the member is campaigning when the campaign staff has published brochures with a photograph of the candidate in a military uniform, a practice that is allowed when the photograph is presented as biographical information and does not imply an official endorsement. 67 Expanding these prohibitions to other parties is not feasible because of constitutional 68 and enforcement concerns, but the inability to do so highlights the difficulty of preventing the perception of military partisanship when both law and policy permit politicians to serve on active duty for extended periods. 94 No exception to DOD policy followed, and the veracity of Buyer's statements became a campaign issue in Indiana, 95 presenting DOD with a partisan minefield to negotiate. and DODD 1344.10 that cannot be eliminated by amending them. These shortcomings are the inability to delineate all prohibited civil office functions, the difficulty in changing an erroneous perception of partisanship once it has been created by a violation of the rules, and the inability to regulate actions of members of a civil officeholder's staff and others that may create the perception of military partisanship even when the civil officeholder follows the rules.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE
This recommended policy change does not go as far as the suggestion that all elected civil officeholders be excluded from reserve service, 100 but it is similarly based on the idea that protecting the military from partisanship must take priority over having an active reserve force that includes all civilian occupations. The change will be unpopular among affected politicians who believe they can simultaneously serve their nation and their constituents, but it is necessary 
Congress appears comfortable with allowing its members to serve in a Reserve
Component, but this is a good time for the Executive Branch to raise the Incompatibility Clause issue. With the four Congressmen now in military service all Republicans, 104 it is unlikely that anyone would attribute partisan motives to a request that they a resign their commissions or retire.
CONCLUSION
The ongoing partial mobilization has shown that current law and policy governing civil officeholders in military service inadequately protects the military from involvement in partisan politics or the perception thereof. It prioritizes accommodation of politicians' desire to serve in protect a society without having it usurp the society's democratic principles. In the early theories, a professional military that avoids partisan politics is seen as essential to maintaining civilian control of the military and thus preventing this usurpation. Samuel Huntington expressed an absolutist view of the political neutrality of military officers, stating that "politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, . . . ." Under his theory, professional military officers operate completely outside the political sphere, and because they pose no threat to civilian control, they are allowed to apply their expertise without the civilian interference that would lead to society being less protected. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2, 71, 83-85. Morris Janowitz put forth a more realistic theory, recognizing that military professionals, as products of civilian society, hold political beliefs and must often operate in the political realm to effectively carry out their duties. But his theory still relies on the "partisan neutrality" of military professionals as a primary mechanism of civilian control. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1971) , 234. While these theories have been challenged for relying too much on professionalism to ensure civilian control of the military, the early theorists' view that nonpartisanship is an important element of military professionalism is widely shared. Peter D. Code, vol. 10, sec. 577 (1952) . 17 In 1870, Congress passed a law prohibiting Army officers on the active list from holding any elective or appointive civil office. It also stated that any officer accepting or exercising the functions of a civil office would "thereby cease to be an officer of the Army" and that "his commission shall be thereby vacated. Code, vol. 10, sec. 973(b) (1970) . Like its predecessors, this provision applied only to regular officers on the active list and provided that acceptance of a civil office or the exercise of its functions would terminate an officer's appointment. In 1980, Congress substituted "active duty" for "active list" in Section 973(b). Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Statutes at Large 94, sec. 116, 2878 Large 94, sec. 116, (1980 . 19 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 , Statutes at Large 97, sec. 1002 Large 97, sec. , 655 (1983 . This law was a complete rewrite of Title 10, United States Code, Section 973(b). Its expanded coverage included not only regular officers on the active-duty list, but also retired regular officers and reserve officers when serving on active duty under a call or order to active duty for a period over 180 days. The law also modified the prohibition on holding and exercising the functions of civil offices so that it applied to only certain offices in the U.S. Government, but covered officers were still prohibited from holding and exercising the functions of all state and local civil offices. Finally, the law removed the language automatically terminating the military appointment of an officer that violated one of the section's prohibitions. 20 An exception for civil offices on school boards located exclusively on military reservations was added as Title 10, United States Code, Section 973(c) in 1990. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 , Statutes at Large 104, sec. 556, 1570 ; United States Code, vol. 10, sec 973(c) (1994) . ) predecessor then in effect, allowed members of the regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to accept a nomination for a civil office if such nomination was tendered without direct or indirect solicitation on the member's part. Reserve members on active duty could become candidates for civil office without this restriction. The agreement also provided that in the case of both regular and reserve members, candidacy for civil office could not interfere with their military duties and, if elected, the member could not "act in his official capacity as the holder of the office, or perform any of the duties thereof" while on active duty. While not automatic, the agreement contemplated discharge or release from active duty as the usual result following a member's election to civil office. War and Navy Departments, "Participation of Members of the Armed Services in Political Campaigns." The agreement did not address campaigning, probably because of the assumed applicability of the Hatch Act to military personnel. The initial DODD 1344.10 made no distinction between regular and reserve members on active duty in its policy on candidacy for civil office and campaigning, although it applied only to members on active duty for more than 30 days. Code, vol. 5, secs. 7321-26 (2000) .
